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Harris: We Should Persuade Iran with Bargains not Bombs

WE SHOULD PERSUADE IRAN WITH BARGAINS NOT BOMBS
By Theodore Adam Harris
America is still in a cloudy haze of the aftermath of what happened on September 11, 2001. The dust may have settled, but fear and itchy trigger fingers are still present. We are currently fighting the “War on Terror” both
in Iraq and in Afghanistan. There is growing concern over Iran’s decision to
resume uranium enrichment directly challenging the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), and quite frankly, the entire global community.
Iran’s recently elected president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, basically told the
world to “get lost”, claiming that their nuclear activities are for peaceful
purposes. He has also made very inflammatory remarks such as “Israel
should be wiped off the face of the earth”. Both President Bush and Vice
President Cheney have made it clear that our country will “not allow the
world’s most dangerous regimes to possess the world’s most dangerous
weapons” (Daalder, 2006, p.1). “The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), with the associated risk that terrorists might get their
hands on WMD, is emerging as the worldview…replacing the unifying
scheme of containment which governed American and Western policy during
the Cold War” (Russell, 2004, p.31). The wars currently being waged in
Iraq and Afghanistan represent a paradigm shift in American foreign policy;
no longer are we focusing on containment, instead, pre-emptive strikes have
become the order of the day.
Introduction
American and Iranian leaders are
talking a great deal about each other
when they should be spending more time
talking to each other. Iran’s defiance of
the IAEA has raised questions about Tehran’s desire to build nuclear weapons
and this in turn has put that country
squarely into the cross-hairs of the
hawks in Washington. This case study
reflects my search to answer a logical
question stemming from the current
backdrop; should we bomb Iran in order
to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons? I am a U.S. Marine
Corps combat veteran from the first gulf
war where I acted as an Iranian linguist
signals intelligence and crypto-logic
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technician. It is impossible for me not to
be passionate about our policies in the
Middle East. My interpretation of this
research tells me that the United States
should begin direct communications
with Iran. The social and behavioral sciences play a huge role in determining a
policy outcome. Predicting how Iran
and the rest of the world will react to our
actions is of great importance. Just as a
chess player tries to look at every future
move, so to do we need a predictable
strategy. This study will express the reasoning I have used to arrive at my claim
that we should try to persuade Iran away
from building nuclear weapons with bilateral talks and bargains not bombs.
We, the United States, have not had a
diplomatic relationship with Iran since
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the revolution in 1979. Twenty-seven
years of not communicating. That is a
long time to hold a grudge. In essence, I
have discovered that now is the time to
“burry the hatchet”.
Methodology and Theory
I have limited my research to
only certain nation states as entities of
interest. I have obtained an understanding of the major stakeholder’s positions,
namely, the United States, Europe and
Iran. It is from this understanding that I
have formed an opinion as to what the
best foreign policy decisions with respect to Iran obtaining nuclear weapons
should be. I have used a heuristic approach, examining both previous literature and particular case studies concerning American responses to an atomic
Iran. I have read articles, speeches,
books, journals, and websites on the
topic at hand. I have thoroughly examined and annotated each source, asking
questions about their validity, audience,
peer review, if they are current, objective, et cetera.
I have incorporated Edward
Said’s theory concerning Orientalism
and Jurgen Habermas’s ideas related to
“ideal speech”, using them as an overall
lens to help me uncover answers to this
enormously real and important debate.
Edward Said proposed that before there
could be Western colonialism there must
be this idea of a distinction between the
“East” and the “West”. “If the East was
viewed as despotic and backward, and
the West as worthy and noble, expanding Western power into these regions
could be rationalized” (Seidman, 1994,
p. 266). He called this phenomena “Orientalism”. I argue that there is a reemergence of this happening today; it
can be found in the language. They call
us the “Great Satan” and in turn we have
CS&P
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labeled them as part of the “Axis of
Evil”. It is a classic struggle between
“Us” and “Them”. This rhetoric demonstrates a form of Orientalism, which
could be used to rationalize American
military action against Iran; after all, not
long after Iraq was labeled as being part
of the “Axis of Evil”, we invaded that
country.
While thinking about how difficult talks with Iran would be, I latched
on to Jurgen Habermas’s ideas concerning “ideal speech situations”. Seidman
explains this as “a social condition in
which the parties to public discourse are
in a situation of equality and autonomy”
(Ibid, p.126). My interpretation is that in
order for real dialogue to occur, resulting
in real exchanges of compromises, both
parties must recognize each other’s true
concerns, and any hint of coercion on the
part of one side undermines the communication completely. Using this as a
lens, I was shocked to discover the absence of any real dialogue or “ideal
speech” between the United Sates and
Iran dating back to before the Islamic
revolution in 1979.
Discoveries and Discussion
Witnessing combat first hand has
opened my eyes to the devastating social
effects caused by the sheer death and
destruction associated with modern day
warfare. One of the best scholarly
sources I found that advocates a military
strategy is Richard Russell’s article entitled: Iran in Iraq’s Shadow: dealing
with Tehran’s nuclear weapons bid.
This article provides a clear and decisive
look at the exact issue I am wrestling
with. It is an extensive overview and
analysis of American reactions to Iranian
nuclear efforts. The most alarming thing
is that American military action is purportedly not just necessary, but that it
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should be preformed before Iran obtains
a nuclear bomb. After which, the retaliatory threat might pose to be an even
greater risk for America. He acknowledges that diplomacy may have some
running room left but really dismisses
the idea in favor of derailing the Iranian
nuclear program with force. Russell argues: “the prospects for the transfer of
nuclear weapons to non-state actors is
greater in the case of Iran than it was for
Saddam’s regime, because Tehran has
been much more active than Baghdad
had been in the sponsorship of terrorist
operations, particularly those orchestrated by Hezbollah, against the United
States” (p.42). This article was written
in 2004, it is incredibly up to speed, almost foreshadowing current events. The
audience seems to be the US military as
it was published by the US Army War
College. It acts as an in depth analysis
and risk assessment.
Mr. Russell paints a scary picture
and if coupled with the most recent
rhetoric out of Tehran, some could argue
that we should start the engines on our
B-52 Bombers immediately. Iran’s
president was just quoted as saying: “Israel resembles a rotten tree which will be
annihilated with the onset of one storm”
(Olmert, 2006). The risk of a nuclear
bomb exploding in an American city, or
Israel for that matter can be seen as so
great that the idea of bombing Iranian
nuclear facilities could easily be rationalized.
The following reasoning clearly
states why we should resort to military
force, and deserves mentioning: “The
difference with any action against Iran is
stark: there is hard evidence of genuine
WMD in preparation; hard, stated evidence of intent. Also, a clearly defined,
containable and comparatively attainable
military objective exists; knocking out
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the enrichment site at Natanz” (Liddle,
2006, p1). The enrichment site at
Natanz is being built underground with
thousands of centrifuges. The IAEA
found this very alarming because it
represents highly irregular activity if in
fact the program is merely for peaceful
purposes. “Natanz seems an agreeable
little town, perched nearly 5,000ft up in
the majestic mountains of central Iran,
full of dusty relics of Alexander the
Great and black-clad peasants scurrying
hither and thither. It is a shame, then,
that we may soon be obliged to bomb it
to smithereens. An even bigger shame,
though, if we don't” (Ibid, p1).
It was easier to find examples of
why bombing Iran is the wrong policy
decision. “A United States attack on
Iran would likely cause a spike in the
price of oil, alienate Muslims, create a
split within the NATO alliance, and lead
to an increase in terrorism; it might even
draw Iranian forces over the border to
attack U.S. troops” (Hunter, 2006, p. 1).
These are all unwanted results especially
when the action itself may or may not
completely destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities. One report suggests “at best it
would set back Iran’s program by a few
years, but it would inflame public opinion there and unify the nation in its determination to go nuclear” (Fareed, Z.,
2006, p.31). This opinion is echoed
throughout most of my research findings. The idea that even if we disrupted
Iran’s immediate capabilities, bombing
them would only hurt us in the long run
because it would rally patriotic fervor
against America like never seen before.
An example that comes to mind is the
bombing of Pearl Harbor, the average
American proudly joined up immediately with the national war effort. Most
reports that I have read suggest a similar
reaction in Iran.
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We are faced with two undesirable options. On one hand, we could
bomb Iranian nuclear facilities because
the threat is great. On the other, we
could keep up the same old saber rattling
and feeble attempts to go through third
parties to negotiate a settlement, in turn,
Iran goes nuclear. Both approaches are
unacceptable. I argue that there is another avenue of attack. Using my “ideal
speech” lens, I feel that it may be possible to persuade Iran with a new and bold
move, namely, try to listen to what they
are truly concerned about. Of course
that would mean that we too would have
to vocalize our true concerns in an open
and “equally autonomous” forum. That
forum does not include the United Nations, how could it if Iran does not possess nearly the same pull as America
within its halls? By function alone,
America has veto power; Iran on the
other hand does not. I am confident that
Habermas would suggest something different and not even close to third party
negotiations. An ideal speech situation
can only occur with direct bi-lateral talks
between Iran and the United States.
Throughout my research I found
numerous opinions that call for direct
communication. Looking through the
“ideal speech” lens this situation begs
for the next logical question: How do
we create such an atmosphere or “ideal
speech situation” where both Iran and
the United States can really negotiate a
settlement? Unfortunately, I have no
answer as of yet. I know Iran and the
United States have extreme differences
and it would be easy to label us as enemies, but that has not stopped America
in the past. “Summits with the opposition are a great American tradition.
President Richard Nixon went to Beijing
even though China was aiding North
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Vietnam in its fight against U.S. forces.
President Ronald Reagan proclaimed the
Soviet Union "an evil empire" but still
negotiated agreements with it on arms
control and other issues. Currently, the
Bush administration talks directly to
North Korea, perhaps the most dangerous and delusional regime in the world.
America has never limited itself to talking only with its friends abroad.”
(Hunter, 2006). I disagree with Mr.
Hunter on one point; we have limited
ourselves, because it has been over
twenty-seven years since we have spoken directly to Iran.
President Ahmedinejad wrote a
letter to President Bush in May of 2006.
This letter represents the first official
Iranian communication with an
American president in 27 years. He
should take the opportunity of this
opening and offer to engage in
unconditional talks with Tehran aimed at
resolving all outstanding disputes,
including the nuclear one, with an eye to
normalizing diplomatic relations as soon
as possible. As loathsome as Americans
find Iran’s hatred of the West, we still
need to acknowledge their concerns if
we have any interest in persuading them
to stop building nuclear weapons. I fear
that our government might just disregard
this letter as hate mail instead of truly
attempting to figure out what they are
trying to say. Edward Said might claim
that the time for tearing down the wall
that separates the Occident from the Orient has arrived.
I sought to find out if Ahmedinejad was the right man to bargain with;
the decision is still pending. I found the
following interactive chart to be educational; it acts as a superb synopsis of the
Iranian political power structure today.

Vol 5 Num 1

December 2006

4

Harris: We Should Persuade Iran with Bargains not Bombs

Published by Digital Commons @ CSUMB, 2006

5

Culture, Society, and Praxis, Vol. 5, No. 1 [2006], Art. 3

Figure 2: Iran: Who Holds the Power? BBC News [online edition] Retrieved May 17, 2006 from:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/cabinet.stm

Conclusion
I think that America should stop
talking about Iran and begin a campaign
of talking to Iran. My military experience has shaped my values in an ironic
way. On one hand, I value the protection and security of America, and on the
other, I value using the military option as
the ultimate last resort because I am familiar with the devastating social impact
that the resulting death and destruction
leave behind. My research was very
limited in scope and detail and consisted

solely of searching through literature on
the subject. I must acknowledge that it
has only left me asking myself more
questions. I set out originally asking if
we should bomb Iran to prevent that
country from obtaining nuclear weapons.
Using the logic and reasoning that I have
presented, I have discovered one important and concrete finding throughout my
research; America should try to persuade
Iran away from building nuclear weapons with bi-lateral talks not bombs.
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